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Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? The 
number of countries that have had female leaders continues to expand, but little is known about 
how domestic audiences reward or punish female (relative to male) leaders for foreign policy 
choices. This study examines how the gender of a national leader conditions the relationship 
between their hawkish/dovish ideology and public approval for rapprochement policies. 
Experimental evidence establishes that voters approve more of hawkish leaders that extend the 
olive branch to adversary nations than of dovish leaders who do so. Drawing on the extant 
literature, I develop and test expectations about the effect of gender on public approval against a 
sample of 128 leaders from 31 countries in 1975–2018. I find that female national leaders 
(especially those of right-leaning ideology) tend to be penalized relative to men:  all else equal, 
women receive lower domestic approval than men. Interestingly, the public opinion data reveal 
that neither male nor female leaders experience the hawk’s advantage for deviating from prior 
aggressive policy positions. Instead, all leaders across all ideologies receive more support as they 
 iv 
exhibit more compromising foreign policy behaviors. However, conflict outcomes, unlike 
ideology, do not statistically significantly moderate public support of executives.    
(61 pages)    
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
The Dove’s Advantage: Impact of Gender and Conflict 
on Executive Approval  
Micala H. Gillespie  
 
Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? The number 
of countries that have had female leaders continues to expand, but little is known about how 
domestic audiences reward or punish female (relative to male) leaders for foreign policy choices. 
This study examines how the gender of a national leader conditions the relationship between 
their hawkish/dovish ideology and public approval for rapprochement policies in militarized 
interstate conflicts. Results from time-series cross-sectional data using multiple regression 
models with fixed effects from 31 countries and 127 leaders show that public approval tends to 
be lower for women leaders and that right-of-center women are particularly prone to public 
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Do citizens evaluate female vs. male leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently? As 
women often face a ‘double bind’ wherein “they experience disapproval for more masculine 
behaviors, such as asserting clear-cut authority over others, as well as for their more feminine 
behaviors, such as being especially supportive of others” (Eagly, 2007), women in national 
leadership positions may be limited in their ability to navigate foreign policy well if they cannot 
anticipate how domestic audiences will receive their actions. On the one hand, if women are 
more likely to be supported in pursuing peace than men, then there may be more room for 
reconciliation between adversarial nations when a woman is elected to the executive office. This 
may represent a reason to elect females more frequently and may light the way for more female 
leadership in other arenas. On the other hand, if women are only supported by voters when 
initiating or escalating a conflict, or when acting outside of ‘soft’ or feminine gender stereotypes, 
then women leader may select more hostile foreign policy outcomes, to the detriment of 
international peace. As a state’s decision to work towards compromise with another country or 
go to war with them is one of the most consequential, the uncertainty around the way gender and 
public opinion interact to create incentives and penalties for leaders during conflict is of great 
concern. 
This thesis advances our understanding of how female national leaders are evaluated 
relative to their male counterparts by testing whether the gender of the national leader interacts 
with their 1) their ideology to influence domestic public approval and 2) their conflict outcomes 
to impact public approval. Using the theoretical insights from public opinion literature on “out of 
character” policy, policy deviation by hawks and doves, and scholarship on public opinion of 
female leadership, I argue that because men and women in leadership positions are evaluated 
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differently by domestic audiences, there likely exists a public approval reward for male leaders 
who deviate from their prior policy reputation while female leaders receive no change in 
approval for deviating from prior policy reputations. Where men who deviate from their prior 
positions when dealing with international adversaries are viewed as moderates who are willing to 
set aside their own interests for that of the nation, women are not. I test this argument against a 
new, cross-national dataset with a sample of 128 leaders from 31 countries between 1975 and 
2018, with 110 men in 31 countries and 18 women across 14 different countries. 
This work makes three major contributions to extant scholarship on gender, public 
opinion, and domestic sources of foreign policy.  
First, it brings gender to the forefront of public approval literature as a significant 
conditioning factor. The number of women in the highest positions of national leadership 
continues to expand, but the scholarship on their public approval is severely lacking and thus 
women coming into these positions may be at a disadvantage in not understanding how domestic 
audiences will react to their actions.  
Second, it tests the expectations for policy deviation for both men and women, using 
public opinion data. Though prior research has attempted to shed light on shifts in public 
approval for policies that deviate from the leader’s prior reputation by using experimental data, 
little is known about whether these findings apply to women and whether these findings hold up 
empirically. While there is good reason to use experimental research design, the penalties leaders 
face would likely be more severe in an experimental setting because leaders strategically avoid 
situations where their policy responses would knowingly be punished by voters. Using 
observational public opinion data is advantageous in that it presents a conservative bias that may 
be more accurate in assessing shifts in public approval due to a leader’s foreign policy.   
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Third, it compares public approval for both escalation and de-escalation policies by 
female-led and male-led states in conflict where prior research typically focuses on one or the 
other. To this author’s knowledge, no research has explicitly tested public approval of both 
hawks and doves in the pursuit of both peace and conflict. Existing research has primarily 
focused on the question of whether Nixon was the only one able to maintain public support when 
opening relations with China, essentially confining research to public approval of a hawk de-
escalating conflict.  
The thesis is structured in four main sections. The first is a discussion of existing 
literature on public opinion of “out of character” policy, policy deviations by hawks and doves, 
public opinion on female leadership, and whether women in the workplace are evaluated 
differently than women in the highest positions of national leadership.  The second section 
outlines my theory, building off existing findings that voters sometimes perceive policy 
deviations by male leaders as a sign of moderation and credibility, and that gender biases cause 
women to be evaluated differently than men. The third section is my research design and 
describes my data, variables, and method in depth. The thesis concludes with my analysis of both 
a full sample with two-way interactions and a split sample of men and women with de facto 
three-way interactions, as well as a discussion of my robustness checks, limitations, and 
implications for future work.
 0 
EXTANT LITERATURE 
Public Opinion on “Out of Character” Policy 
Research on consequences for leaders who act out of character or implement “unlikely” 
policies, hereafter referred to as a policy deviation or norm deviation, is limited and often 
conflicting. While some argue that leaders who ‘flip-flop’ or act outside of what is expected of 
them are viewed as inconsistent and penalized, others show that leaders who deviate from their 
established reputations may draw more favor from voters compared to leaders who do not 
deviate. Whether these norms were based on party, ideology, or previous policy stances, it is 
unclear whether support for policies outside one’s typical reputation leads to an increase or 
decrease in public approval of the leader and their policy. This is a difficult question to study 
from observational data because leaders should select only to change their positions if they 
believe it will benefit their circumstance.   
Tomz and Van Houweling (2009, 2012) use survey-based experimental data to show that 
candidate repositioning is penalized because it prompts voters to discount the candidate’s current 
policies and to draw negative inferences about the candidate’s character. Tomz (2007) posits that 
this penalty might be not only stem from negative inferences about the candidate, but also from 
citizens’ concerns about the country’s international reputation. Other survey experiments show 
that the president loses support both when “backing down” from public threats and “backing 
into” foreign conflicts (Levy et. Al., 2015) and roll call voting data shows that significant 
electoral costs exist for senators who change their positions (DeBacker, 2014). Croco (2016) 
argues the middle ground, that citizens do not always react negatively to a leader who changes 
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his/her position, but are generally indifferent between a consistent and an inconsistent politician 
provided that the politician supports the citizens’ own current preferred policy. 
 Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) on the other hand, find that under democratic 
conditions large shifts in economic policy are more likely to be implemented by the “unlikely” 
party and that the more “unlikely” a policy is, the more incumbent parties gain an electoral 
advantage. They theorize that this phenomenon is due to voters judging the credibility of the 
policy based on the ideological identity of the policymaker. Cowen and Sutter (1998) also find 
that right wing politicians are better suited to pursue left wing policies, because only a right-wing 
politician can signal the credibility or soundness of a left-wing policy. While Petrocik (1996) and 
Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen (2003) show that candidates increase their electoral prospects by 
campaigning on and enhancing the salience of issues that their party has a reputation for 
‘owning’ or caring about (i.e., Republicans would own issues of taxation and the size of 
government, while Democrats would own social welfare issues), the country’s status and security 
are issues that are not typically ‘owned’ by any one party (Petrocik et. al., 2003, p. 599) and thus 
it remains unclear whether how voters might reward or penalize leaders for taking action in this 
arena. 
Policy Deviation by Hawks and Doves 
When it comes to foreign policy, recent findings demonstrate that hawkish leaders who 
deviate from the norm of military force and instead pursue diplomatic or conciliatory policies, 
enjoy a significant boost in domestic approval ratings compared to dovish leaders who pursue the 
exact same policy. It’s relevant to note that deviation from hawkish and dovish norms may or 
may not constitute ‘flip-flopping’ on policy, i.e., a deviation constitutes a ‘flip-flop’ only if it 
contradicts previous explicit promises on a given issue. Here, leaders may be viewed as deviating 
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when they act outside their typical foreign policy preference for diplomatic vs. military means, 
but may not be switching sides on specific policies. To be clear, hawks in this analysis are 
characterized as leaders who typically favor military solutions over diplomatic ones and often 
have reputations for emphasizing military force as an essential element in protecting national 
security. They emphasize that they will not shy away from using force where necessary and are 
likely to have a mindset that “the only way to achieve peace is to be ready for war” (Mattes and 
Weeks, 2019, p. 58). Doves on the other hand, are described as leaders who prefer diplomatic 
solutions over military ones. They typically emphasize that they believe diplomacy, cooperation, 
and negotiations are key to national security and that they will use military force as a last resort. 
The mindset of a dove would be that “the only way to achieve peace is to act peacefully” (Mattes 
and Weeks, 2019, p. 58). Hawkish and dovish affiliations are thus distinct from ideological and 
party affiliations, as they describe a leader’s overall foreign policy preferences.  
Existing literature appears to primarily support a ‘hawk’s advantage’ in pursuing peace 
and a disadvantage for doves who do the same. When hawks attempt to reconcile with a 
distrusted adversary, voters react more favorably to them than dovish leaders who pursue the 
exact same policy. However, the jury is still out on how voters perceive hawkish behavior. Based 
on this theory of a domestic approval boost for leaders who act out of character, one might 
expect doves to be rewarded when pursuing conflict and hawks to be penalized for pursuing 
conflict, but there is no definitive evidence yet. Schultz’s (2005) models suggest that hawks are 
more likely to initiate cooperation and more likely to see it last, but this analysis does not 
examine how public approval changes as a function of such decisions. Mattes and Weeks (2019) 
use survey experiments to demonstrate support for the thesis that hawks are better positioned to 
pursue peace, finding that voters penalized both hawks and doves for opting for rapprochement 
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over a status quo policy, but that the penalty was much more severe for doves. They also 
demonstrate that even when the policy succeeded in eliciting a positive response from the 
adversary, hawks were rewarded but doves were still penalized, theorizing that voters base their 
public approval on assessments of the leader’s moderation and the policy’s credibility. This 
suggests that voters do not condition their approval on the policy or policy outcome, but rather 
on who is implementing the policy. 
Counterarguments for why hawks should not experience an advantage in pursuing peace 
also exist, with Clare (2014) showing that doves are rewarded in some ways for norm adherence 
because their diplomatic reputations give them greater bargaining leverage with adversaries who 
would rather deal with a diplomatic leader than a militaristic one. However, this study does not 
focus on how public opinion changes as a result of these policy choices, as it only examines an 
adversary’s likelihood of cooperating. Fehr (2014) also studies hawks pursuing peace and casts 
doubt on the idea that the leader’s reputation matters at all, arguing that in the case of a hawkish 
Nixon resuming relations with a then isolated communist China, public opinion was already 
shifting on communism and that leaders can pursue ‘unlikely’ policies with minimal domestic 
repercussions as long as “conditions are favorable and audience costs can be minimized.”  
To sum up, experimental evidence suggests that policy deviation in foreign affairs tends 
to be rewarded by voters. Yet, no empirical studies have put this question to the test directly, 
while indirect evidence on the domestic advantage in pursuing out-of-character foreign policy 
appears to have mixed support.  
Public Opinion on Female Leadership 
In the past half century, 56 of the 146 nations (38%) studied by the World Economic 
Forum in 2014 and 2016 have elected a female head of government or state for at least one year, 
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excluding figurehead roles (Pew, 2017). In 31 of these countries, women have led for five years 
or less, in 10 nations they have led for only a year, and at least 13 have had women leaders who 
held office for less than a year (Pew, 2017). These female-led states have included the United 
Kingdom, Israel, Liberia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, France, Germany, Poland, 
Canada, Brazil, Nicaragua, Argentina, Finland, Norway, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and New Zealand (Reiter, 2015). Although it is clear that female national leadership is not 
confined to one geographic region or regime type, there exists a significant gap in the empirical 
work both exploring the incentives women face for different conflict behaviors as well as the 
way an executive’s gender, ideological affiliation, and dispute outcomes interact when pursuing 
international peace or conflict. The following section outlines existing theories on the 
relationship between gender and public expectations of leadership, with most of the literature 
stressing that female leaders are evaluated differently than their male counterparts and may face 
different incentives and penalties based on gender biased reactions to their leadership.   
Gendered expectations are often based on both descriptive stereotypes about how 
individuals actually behave as well as proscriptive stereotypes about how they should behave 
(Eagly and Karau 2002). Though gender and sex are not the same, with the former being a social 
construct that does not always coincide with biological sex, there are societal expectations that 
men will be masculine, and women will be feminine. Burns and Kattelman (2017) among many 
others state that this difference “makes the study of gender in International Relations particularly 
murky, especially quantitatively.” As Everitt and Gaudet (2016) note, male leaders are 
consistently stereotyped as being more strong, competent, tough, and assertive than women 
(Alexander and Anderson, 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993; McDermott, 1997). Women, on 
the other hand, are stereotyped as conflict averse (Burns and Kattelman, 2017), compassionate, 
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warm (Alexander and Anderson, 1993), emotional, people-oriented, gentle, kind, passive, caring, 
and sensitive (Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993). It remains unclear how much of this is due to 
biological or sociological factors, but research does show that men and women typically favor 
different perspectives on interpersonal conflict (Gilligan, 1982), negotiation strategies (Boyer et 
al., 2009) support for democratic candidates in the US context (Chaturvedi, 2016), casualty 
concerns, appropriate use of force (Eichenberg, 2003), prioritization of humanitarian vs. 
economic and strategic concerns, and multilateralism (Brooks and Valentino, 2011). These facts 
together demonstrate that there will likely be assumptions, expectations, and stereotypes that are 
more likely to attribute a hawkish preference to men while attributing a dovish preference to 
women.  
These stereotypes result in a ‘double bind’ for female leaders in that they must 
demonstrate masculine qualities to show that they are strong enough to lead and aggressive 
enough to protect, as well as traditionally feminine traits of cooperation and compassion in order 
to not violate gender roles (Burns and Kattelman, 2017). Further, gendered expectations and 
stereotypes appear to work against women who seek positions of power even if they exhibit the 
same behavior as men (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992). For example, the ‘backlash effect’ 
is thought to exist for female politicians who adopt masculine approaches, with perceptions of 
role incongruity resulting in more negative and critical assessments due to negative perceptions 
that accompany broken status norms (Butler and Geis, 1990; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Gidengil 
and Everitt, 2003; Meeks, 2012; Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010; Ridgeway, 2001). Post and Sen 
(2020) point out that while women may feel the need to adopt more agentic attributes in order to 
rise to leadership roles, or those attributes that demonstrate assertiveness, independence, 
ambition, dominance, forceful, confidence, or competitiveness, they still experience negative 
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reactions from both men and women, and are viewed as emotional, less credible, and less 
competent, while their male counterparts are viewed as more competent and credible (p. 4). 
These findings have been documented elsewhere about female leaders who engage in discipline 
(Atwater, Carey, and Waldman, 2001; 2005), initiation of salary negotiations (Bowles, Babcock, 
and Lai, 2007), authoritative leadership style (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky, 1992), 
competitiveness (Rudman and Glick, 1999), criticism (Sinclair and Kunda, 2000), and self-
promotion (Rudman, 1998). The backlash women in leadership positions receive for any agentic, 
strong, or confident behavior is unfortunate, as women faced with scrutiny in masculinized 
policy areas like national security often resort to more hawkish behavior or adopt more 
aggressive foreign policies in order to gain credibility and avoid being seen as ‘soft’ (Burns and 
Kattelman, 1992; Dube and Harish, 2017; Koch and Fulton, 2011).  
Women in the Workplace vs. the Oval Office 
The question remains then as to how women in the highest national leadership positions 
have gained and maintained their seats despite facing penalties for both masculine and feminine 
behavior. One possible explanation is that voters may expect masculine behavior in foreign 
policy and more feminine behavior in domestic policy. Jalalzai (2008, 2010) argues that women 
as ‘unifiers of the family’ may be elected after conflict under the expectation that they will unify 
the country or in instances where their powers are constrained. This is not uncommon, as several 
women have been elected to office directly following a conflict, perhaps because women’s 
values and temperaments are believed to contrast favorably against those of the men who got the 
nation into the conflict (Burns and Kattelman, 1992).  
The more compelling explanation for the paradox of women rising to leadership positions 
even when they face a ‘double bind’ however, may be that women who have been elected to the 
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highest national leadership positions as presidents or prime ministers are evaluated differently 
than women in the workplace and women in other levels of government. While the bulk of social 
science and psychology research supports the idea of a ‘backlash’ effect for women exhibiting 
agentic behavior in general, there is robust evidence in the international relations realm that 
female national leaders are rewarded for masculine behavior, and indeed must be masculine in 
order to rise to their positions and maintain them. For example, several researchers have found 
that an increase in domestic gender equality levels and female legislators often leads to lower 
levels of conflict and defense spending, but that having a female executive in office has the 
opposite result with higher levels of defense spending and higher probability of escalating 
disputes to violence (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Koch and Fulton, 2011). This is 
not because female executives are more prone to violence and conflict initiation than men, but 
rather that they are much more likely to have their bluffs called, their resolve questioned, their 
disputes resisted and reciprocated, and be forced to take more escalatory measures to 
demonstrate their resolve (Post and Sen, 2020, Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Burns and Kattelman 
(1992) provide a further explanation for these findings, theorizing that the reason female 
executives are more likely to uphold political empowerment rights while being less likely to 
respect physical integrity rights is that women are generally more inclusive of marginalized and 
minority groups, but have to “uphold their authority with an iron fist” and crush dissent when the 
time calls for it. Women elected to the highest positions of state leadership may not be any 
different in character or ideology than their male counterparts or women in other arenas, but 
biases against them seem to provoke, reward, and necessitate more aggressive leadership and 
conflict behavior. 
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The experiences of leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Golda Meir appear 
to support the ‘masculine’ selection effect for national leadership positions. Fukuyama (1998) 
cites Thatcher’s role in the Falkland War and fight against the Irish Republican Army, Indira 
Gandhi’s war with Pakistan and trials against Sikh separatists, and Golda Meir’s heavy-handed 
policies against Palestine and the Arab world as evidence that women are more violent than men. 
However, none of these female leaders initiated the crises in which they were involved (Caprioli 
and Boyer, 2001). Additionally, more recent studies using expanded data show no relationship 
between the gender of the national leader and propensity for interstate conflict (Horowitz, Stam, 
and Ellis, 2015). Therefore, it seems more likely that women are simply forced to exhibit agentic 
and ‘masculine’ behaviors when leading and protecting their countries to gain credibility with 
the public, even if they are likely to be penalized for the same type of aggressive behavior 
elsewhere.  
There is thus far insufficient evidence to determine what kind of behavior voters expect 
from their female national leaders, what situations result in men and women simply being 
rewarded/penalized to different degrees for the same action, and when voters will penalize one 
gender and reward the other. Positivist work in gender and international relations has addressed 
conflict onset, interstate war, human rights, civil war, violence against civilians, international 
norms, and globalization, but until now has not extensively regarded a leader’s gender as a 
significant factor shaping domestic public approval of them and their foreign policy (Reiter, 
2015). As such, my contribution in extending the hawk’s advantage thesis from male leaders 
acting within previously established hawkish and dovish norms, to female leaders acting within 
previously assumed gender norms and hawkish and dovish norms, may help us to better 
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understand the hawk’s advantage and the incentives leading women in power to choose 
cooperation or conflict.  
The Argument: Moderation and Policy Credibility 
Two Mechanisms Whereby Policy Deviation Is Rewarded: Moderation and Credibility  
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) and Cowen and Sutter (1998) were some of the first to 
model the policy credibility mechanism, or the reason why publics might believe a policy is in 
the best interest of the nation (rather than in the best interest of the leader) when it comes from a 
leader who would not typically propose that policy. Mattes and Weeks (2019) were the first to 
test experimentally both the policy credibility mechanism as well a new mechanism that judges 
the leader’s deviation from previously stated policy preferences, the moderation mechanism. 
They demonstrate that voters approve more of hawks (than doves) pursuing rapprochement 
foreign policy because voters’ believe that this strategy is more moderate than a hawk’s earlier 
preference and thus is more in line with the best interest of the nation. While these two 
mechanisms, the moderation and policy credibility mechanisms, are shown to account for why 
publics reward hawks but not doves for peaceful foreign policy decisions in an experimental 
setting (Mattes and Weeks, 2019), it remains to be seen whether this pattern holds up against 
observational data. Furthermore, no study has tested whether the reverse is true about doves 
enjoying an advantage when initiating more hostile foreign policy decisions. Finally, and most 
importantly for this study, no evidence examines whether citizens evaluate female hawks and 
doves differently than male ones. 
The first mechanism is policy moderation. Voters are thought to perceive out-of-character 
behavior or “unlikely” policies as a sign of the leader’s moderation or willingness to 
compromise. Whereas leaders who act within their preferences are more often viewed as 
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extremists, those who deviate are viewed as moderates. Therefore, leaders with hawkish 
preferences are thought to be rewarded by voters when they pursue diplomatic approaches or 
conciliatory policies because they are perceived to be ideologically moderate and compromising, 
whereas leaders with dovish preferences would be penalized for pursuing the exact same action 
because they appear to be ideological zealots or extreme pacifists.  
 The second mechanism is policy credibility. This mechanism contributes to the policy 
deviation advantage and norm adherence disadvantage in that leaders who deviate from their 
expected behaviors are thought to be pursuing policies in the best interest of the nation rather 
than their own. This is distinct from the prior mechanism in that voters are making a judgement 
about the policy, rather than the leader, based on the policy-policymaker pair. When leaders act 
within their preferences and expected norms, voters may find it difficult to discern whether the 
policy is in the best interest of the nation or whether the leader is blindly following their own 
natural policy preference. When hawks pursue militaristic action for example, voters may 
perceive the leader as acting within their own predispositions or inclinations. However, when 
hawks deviate from the norm and pursue diplomatic or conciliatory policies, as Richard Nixon 
did in 1972 delivering the olive branch to a distrusted communist Mao in China, then voters may 
assume the deviation was for the good of the country and must be credible policy rather than a 
personal preference.  
Policy Deviations and Public Approval for Male Leaders 
Table 1 presents the expected trends in public opinion for leaders deviating from and 
adhering to their expressed political ideology; these trends may be labeled as ‘policy norm 
deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage.’ The shaded areas in Table 1 
indicate the findings established in Mattes and Weeks (2019) via a survey experiment (whose 
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survey prompts describe male leaders), while the unshaded areas present the logical implications 
from these findings. Importantly, the unshaded implications in every table of this analysis have 
not yet been tested experimentally; and none of these implications has been tested against 
observational public opinion approval data cross-nationally.  
Based on voters’ perceptions of moderation and policy credibility, Table 1 lays out the 
expectations that leaders who deviate on policy are rewarded by voters, while those who do not 
deviate on policy are punished. This is why in Table 1 hawks are expected to be rewarded for 
dovish behavior in the bottom left quadrant (Mattes and Weeks show that this pattern exists), 
while doves are expected to be rewarded for hawkish behavior in the top right quadrant.  
Table 1 also presents the expected trend that leaders who do not deviate from the policy 
norm expected by their ideology are penalized by voters. This theoretical expectation about a 
policy norm adherence disadvantage (i.e., a penalty for acting in line with one’s reputation) is the 
logical continuation of Mattes and Weeks’s theoretical model that voter reward those leaders 
who deviate because voters assume that the leader is a moderate and the policy is in the nation’s 
interest. By this logic, the expectation is that there will be a penalty for leaders who do not 
deviate from previously expressed hawkish or dovish ideology, because voters would assume 
that the leader is an extremist and the policy is in their own interest, rather than the nation’s. This 
is why hawks are expected to be penalized for hawkish behavior (the top left quadrant of Table 
1), because voters would think they are extreme warmongers and that they are instituting the 
policy in their own interest, not the nation’s. Additionally, doves are expected to be penalized for 
dovish behavior (the bottom right quadrant of Table 1), as voters will believe the leader is an 
extreme pacifist and following their own interests instead of the nation’s.  
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Table 1: Expected public opinion approval for male leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior 
given their prior policy reputations 





No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within hawkish norms  
because the leader appears to be an  
extreme warmonger and the policy 
doesn’t seem credible 
 
 
Policy norm deviation = Reward 
for acting outside of dovish norms  
because the leader appears to be a  






Policy norm deviation = Reward 
for acting outside of hawkish norms 
because the leader appears to be a  




No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within dovish norms because 
the leader appears to be an extreme  
pacifist and the policy doesn’t seem 
credible 
Note: The table compares the expected public approval for male leaders across two 
dimensions: hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The shaded 
areas have been supported experimentally by Mattes and Weeks (2019); the unshaded 
areas are untested.  
To reiterate, the shaded expectations in the bottom row of Table 1 were supported against 
experimental data (Mattes and Weeks, 2019); none of these expectations have been tested against 
observational data. The unshaded quadrants are this author’s extension of the Mattes and Weeks 
(2019) theory that voters base their public approval on assessments of the leader’s moderation 
and the policy’s credibility. The outlined expectations in the top row assume that when male 
leaders follow their prior policy reputations, they will be penalized, and when they deviate from 
their prior policy reputations, they will be rewarded. The contribution in this analysis is that we 
test whether 1) experimental findings are also observed in the empirical world or whether leaders 
select themselves out of penalties completely, and 2) whether the top row scenarios follow the 
logic of the bottom row’s as can be inferred from Mattes and Weeks (2019). 
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To sum up, relying on insights from Mattes and Weeks (2019), I expect that the same 
logic of penalty and reward should apply to situations in which leaders pursue peaceful or 
conflictual foreign policy. Therefore, we should expect:  
H1: All else equal, the public approval of male leaders will tend to increase after male 
leaders take foreign policy actions that deviate from their prior policy reputations. 
H2: All else equal, the public approval of male leaders will tend to decline after male 
leaders take foreign policy actions that adhere to their prior policy reputations. 
Policy Deviations and Deviations from Gender Norms for Women 
When citizens observe hawkish and dovish female leaders select peaceful or conflictual 
foreign policy strategies, they not only judge female leaders’ strategies as policy deviations, but 
also evaluate whether female leaders deviate from gender norms. I argue that in addition to 
‘policy norm deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage,’ female leaders are 
also subject to public opinion punishments and rewards based on their deviation from or 
adherence to gender norms. That is, when it comes to foreign policy, gender itself may have a 
hawkish vs. dovish dimension in the eyes of citizens.  
On the one hand, evidence from other disciplines suggests that women in the workplace 
face a backlash when they display assertive, agentic, or aggressive leadership styles, because 
they are deemed less credible and competent. At the same time, women are expected to practice 
cooperation and compassion in the workplace as to adhere to gender roles. If such ‘double bind’ 
expectations exist for female national leaders, then one might expect that female leaders are 
punished regardless of their previous policy affiliation or foreign policy actions. 
On the other hand, if the evaluation of female leaders based on gender norms mirrors the 
expected ‘policy norm deviation advantage’ and ‘policy norm adherence disadvantage,’ then one 
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would expect that female leaders could benefit from gender norm deviation and could be 
punished for adhering to gender norms. If so, a female leader would be viewed as a moderate 
when pursuing more militant (i.e., more masculine or hawkish) foreign policies, and as an 
extremist when acting as a dove. For instance, evidence from the United States shows that during 
the times of terror threat, a Democratic woman will be evaluated more harshly than a Republican 
woman (Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2016). This may be because female Democrats, that 
tend to position themselves as doves on foreign policy issues, may be penalized for being 
extreme pacifists. By contrast, Republican women, typically affiliated as hawks on foreign 
policy, did not receive as harsh a penalty and may be seen as more moderate because of the way 
their ‘dovish’ gender and ‘hawkish’ political preferences interact.  
It remains unclear whether voters will base assessments of  “out-of-character” behavior 
more on the leader’s prior hawkish and dovish preferences, or on expectations about hawkish 
and dovishness that are derived from gendered stereotypes. Since both aspects (gender and prior 
hawkish/dovish preferences) are likely to be at least somewhat present in the subconscious of 
voters when assessing a leader’s moderation and the credibility of their policy, there is likely an 
interaction effect where gender and hawkish/dovish preferences, as well as gender and 
hawkish/dovish conflict actions, interact to determine public approval.  
While my expectations that male leaders are subject to a policy norm deviation advantage 
(due to perceptions of moderation and credibility) and to a norm adherence disadvantage (due to 
perceptions of extremism and self-interest) have a solid theoretical footing in the extant 
literature, it is unclear whether the same expectations would apply to women. Two different 
patterns emerge in the scholarship on how female leaders are evaluated and are outlined in the 
following two subsections. The first scenario describes the expected changes in public approval 
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for women national leaders who are treated the same as women in the general workplace, where 
they are penalized no matter what behavior they exhibit, i.e., the ‘double bind.’ The second 
scenario shows the expectations of public approval if women in the highest national leadership 
positions are evaluated differently than women in the general workplace and are in fact rewarded 
for their more agentic and masculine behaviors. That is, it is possible that ‘gender norm deviation 
advantage’ and ‘gender norm adherence disadvantage’ exist for female national leaders. 
Assuming Female National Leaders Are Treated Like Women in the Workplace  
Table 2 shows the same public approval rewards for policy norm deviations and penalties 
for adhering to policy norms as Table 1, but makes the leader a female so that gender stereotypes 
are included as a salient factor shaping public opinion. In stressful situations where information 
is lacking, individuals are prone to cognitive bias in which they deploy cognitive shortcuts in 
order to process information (Post and Sen, 2020). As gender stereotypes (both implicit and 
explicit) are one of the most powerful and prevalent cognitive shortcuts, even when compared 
with race, occupation, and age, and are widely shared across cultures, it is likely that in times of 
international conflict with incredibly high stakes and low information, gender stereotypes are 
biasing and simplifying voter perceptions of their female leaders’ complex behavior (Catalyst, 
2007; Eagly and Karau, 2007). The incongruity between ‘soft’ female gender roles and typical 
‘hard’ leadership qualities likely produces a prejudice toward female leaders no matter what 
action they take, leading voters to infer that women both possess less leadership capability and 
are violating their gender roles just by holding their national executive position (Eagly and 
Karau, 2007). The idea of role incongruity can best be exemplified by Pakistani President’s 
statement about Indira Gandhi in 1971, that “Mrs. Gandhi is neither a woman nor a head of state 
by wanting to be both at once” (Post and Sen, 2020, p. 19). 
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As voters hold female candidates to much more stringent qualification standards than 
male candidates (Bauer, 2019), they tend to have dissimilar beliefs about leaders and women 
while holding similar beliefs about leaders and men (Eagly and Karau, 2007). Since citizens call 
on gender stereotype shortcuts in times of crisis, it is likely that voters will have less favorable 
attitudes towards female leaders than male ones and that women will have much greater 
difficulty in being recognized as effective in their roles no matter what actions they take. In this 
way, the backlash effect results in double bind for women in leadership and a penalty for female 
leaders—regardless of their foreign policy actions—arising solely from their gender. 
Where male hawks are expected to be rewarded for dovish behavior (a policy norm 
deviation) and penalized for hawkish behavior (no policy norm deviation, see Table 1), the 
expectations for female hawks should change, because voters would likely be also penalizing 
women for holding leadership positions in which they are deviating from their gender roles. 
Women of both ideological affiliations exhibiting hawkish behavior (the top row of Table 2) are 
therefore expected to receive a penalty due to the backlash effect women face for agentic, 
hawkish, militaristic, and aggressive behavior. Women who exhibit dove behavior by pursuing 
more conciliatory and diplomatic approaches in conflict are also penalized. This is because they 
appear too ‘soft’ in the realm of national security and their gender leads voters to believe they are 
naturally incapable of defending the country. 
Based on the ‘double bind’ worldview, women are penalized just for being women in 
national leadership positions. Thus, the penalties and rewards they receive for policy norm 
deviations are either amplified or balanced out by the penalty they receive because of their 
gender. This means women affiliated as hawks and pursuing militaristic means over diplomatic 
ones would receive two penalties: one for appearing extreme and acting within their own   
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Table 2: Expected public opinion approval for female leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior 
given their prior policy reputations, assuming the ‘double bind’ effect 





No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within hawkish norms  
because the leader appears to be an  
extreme warmonger and the policy 
doesn’t seem credible 
 
 
Gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting outside of gender-based 
assumptions due to the backlash effect 
women face for agentic behavior 
 
 
Result = Double Penalty 
 
Policy norm deviation = Reward  
for acting outside of dovish norms  
because the leader appears to be a  




Gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting outside of gender-based 
assumptions due to the backlash effect 
women face for agentic behavior 
 
 
Result = Status quo  
(because receiving both a penalty and 






Policy norm deviation = Reward  
for acting outside of hawkish norms  
because the leader appears to be a  
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy 
seems credible. This would be the  
typical hawk’s advantage. 
 
 
No gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting within gender-based 
assumptions about women being 
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’  
 
 
Result = Status quo 
(because receiving both a penalty and 
reward should result in no change) 
 
 
No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within dovish norms because 
the leader appears to be an extreme 





No gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting within gender-based 
assumptions about women being dovish 
and appearing too ‘soft’ 
 
 
Result = Double Penalty 
 
Note: The table compares the expected female domestic approval across two dimensions: 
hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The outlined expectations 
assume that female leaders face a “double bind”, i.e., a backlash for deviating from 
gender norms (assertive women are viewed negatively) as well as a backlash for adhering 
to gender norms (feminine women are also viewed negatively).  
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interests when taking hawkish action and one for gendered backlash effects (top left quadrant of 
Table 2).  
Women politically affiliated as doves and taking hawkish action, on the other hand, 
would receive one reward for acting outside of their political affiliation’s policy norm and one 
penalty for gendered backlash effects (top right quadrant of Table 2). The reward for a policy 
norm deviation balances the gender penalty and is expected to make no change in a female 
leader’s public approval. It is unclear whether the reward for policy deviation will offset the 
penalty drawn from gender bias and is especially interesting in determining whether these two 
aspects are given the same weight by voters in the aggregate.  
In the case of women pursuing peace, diplomacy, compromise, rapprochement, or 
conciliatory action, we expect a reward for hawkish women and a penalty for dovish women. 
Women affiliated as hawks are expected to be rewarded for the policy norm deviation because 
their ideological affiliation positions them to be viewed as moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy 
seems more credible (bottom right quadrant of Table 2). This would be the typical hawk’s 
advantage. However, hawkish women still face backlash effects, so this is expected to balance 
out the reward gained from the policy deviation and result in no change of public approval.  
Women affiliated ideologically as doves pursuing dove action would be penalized twice 
for acting within both of their expected policy and gender norms (bottom left quadrant of Table 
2). This policy-policymaker pair is thus expected to receive the greatest drop in approval and 
receive the most punishment from voters because the leader would be viewed as an extreme 
pacifist and the strategy would draw the least amount of credibility because it is viewed as the 
‘natural inclination’ of both females and doves.  
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In summary, if we assume that national female leaders face a double bind, a backlash 
effect, and are treated similar to women in the workplace, we should expect that like women in 
an average workplace, female national leaders just “can’t win.” Adherence to female leaders’ 
prior reputations will tend to punished in both escalatory cases (because hawkish women deviate 
from gender norms) and in de-escalatory scenarios (because dovish women adhere to feminine 
gender norms). We therefore should expect:  
H3: Compared to that of male leaders, the public approval of female leaders will tend to 
stay the same (no approval bump) after female leaders take foreign policy actions that 
deviate from their prior policy reputations. 
H4: Compared to that of male leaders, the public approval of female leaders will tend to 
decline to a greater extent after female leaders take foreign policy actions that adhere 
to their prior policy reputations. 
Assuming National Leaders are Treated Differently than Women in the Workplace 
Social construction of what national leadership should look and behave like entails 
extreme masculine behaviors, which is why national leadership has been one of last frontiers for 
women to break through. Yet women have become chief executives of states across geographic 
regions and regime types. While women undoubtedly face unique challenges in ensuring 
domestic security that a male counterpart of the exact same qualification, political ideology, and 
character would not, empirical trends suggest that female national leaders tend to use force 
internationally to a greater degree than men. Recent examples of female national leaders 
resorting to military force abound: Meir, Gandhi, Thatcher. One after another, a string of 
international relations studies that systematically examine behavior of female versus male 
leaders find that female executives escalate conflict, exhibit higher levels of violence, and are   
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Table 3: Expected public opinion approval for female leaders for hawkish and dovish behavior 
given their prior policy reputations, assuming that women’s deviation from traditional gender 
norms is rewarded by citizens 





No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within hawkish norms  
because the leader appears to be an  
extreme warmonger and the policy 
doesn’t seem credible 
 
 
Gender norm deviation = Reward 
for acting within hawkish norms 
because the leader appears to be to be 
‘strong’ enough to lead and avoids 
being viewed as too soft 
 
 
Result = Status quo  
(because receiving both a penalty and 
reward should result in no change) 
 
 
Policy norm deviation = Reward  
for acting outside of dovish norms  
because the leader appears to be a  




Gender norm deviation = Reward 
for acting within hawkish norms because 
the leader appears to be to be ‘strong’ 
enough to lead and avoids being viewed 
as too soft 
 
 






Policy norm deviation = Reward  
for acting outside of hawkish norms  
because the leader appears to be a  
moderate and the ‘unlikely’ policy 
seems credible. This would be the  
typical hawk’s advantage. 
 
 
No gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting within gender-based 
assumptions about women being 
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’  
 
 
Result = Status quo 
(because receiving both a penalty and 
reward should result in no change) 
 
 
No policy norm deviation = Penalty 
for acting within dovish norms because 
the leader appears to be an extreme 





No gender norm deviation = Penalty  
for acting within gender-based 
assumptions about women being  
dovish and appearing too ‘soft’ 
 
 
Result = Double Penalty 
 
Note: The table compares the expected female domestic approval across two dimensions: 
hawk/dove reputation (affiliation) and hawk/dove behavior. The outlined expectations 
assume that female national leaders are rewarded for more assertive behavior that 
deviates from traditional gender norms.  
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more likely to be reciprocated against than their male counterparts (Post and Sen, 2020, Caprioli 
and Boyer, 2001). Even the analysis of Europe in 1480–1913 reveals that female queens engaged 
in wars more frequently than kings (Dube and Harish, 2020). 
The fact that female leaders are so often selecting behaviors with higher levels of 
violence and aggression suggests that these leaders are selecting these behaviors because they 
expect that it will help them maintain office in the future. Whether the persistence of female 
national leaders exhibiting masculine, aggressive, and violent behavior is due to conscious 
strategic planning and considerations of domestic approval, or due simply to the fact that they are 
challenged more often and simply have to react with an ‘iron fist’ in order to maintain their 
positions, it appears that women who act with more aggression are advantaged. 
Table 3 shows the expected domestic approval consequences for female national leaders 
acting outside hawkish and dovish norms without a ‘backlash effect’ for agentic behavior. 
Rather, in this scenario they are assumed to be treated differently than women in other leadership 
positions, because their post as the chief executive is one of the most consequential for national 
security and thus requires and rewards an agentic approach. Thus, we expect to see a reward for 
women who pursue hawkish and militaristic behavior and propose that there may be a penalty 
when they pursue conciliatory, peaceful, or placatory actions. Table 3 shows this reward for 
gender norm deviations for women of both political affiliations who choose hawk behavior. 
However, because female hawks acting as hawks are not deviating from their political norm, 
they receive a penalty that cancels out the reward they received for gender norm deviation, 
resulting in the status quo. Female doves acting as hawks on the other hand, receive two rewards: 
one for the policy norm deviation and one for the gender norm deviation. This is because voters 
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who see their leaders acting out of character are more likely to view them as moderates and more 
likely to assume the policy must be in the best interest of the nation.  
The bottom row of Table 3 details expectations for public opinion after female leaders 
choose dove behavior. A penalty for women who pursue peace is anticipated, because gender 
biases lead voters to believe that these women are only working towards compromise and 
diplomacy because they cannot control their natural ‘pacifist’ inclinations. Thus, they are more 
likely to be perceived as extreme rather than moderate, ineffective in their leadership role, 
incapable of protecting the country, and following their own blind preferences rather than doing 
what is right for the country. While hawks pursuing peace receive a reward for the policy norm 
deviation that may cancel out this gendered penalty for dove behavior, female doves would 
receive twice the penalty for acting within their expected preferences. If the women that rise to 
chief executive positions are truly treated differently than both their male counterparts and 
women in more general leadership roles, then doves pursuing conflict would receive the highest 
gains in domestic approval while doves pursuing peace would see the greatest declines in 
domestic approval. 
 In summary, if we assume that national female leaders are treated differently than women 
in an average workplace such that citizens reward female leaders for more assertive behaviors, 
i.e., for deviating from traditional gender roles, we should expect:  
H5: Compared to male leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a hawkish 
reputation is not expected to fluctuate in response to escalatory/de-escalatory foreign 
policy actions.  
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H6: Compared to male dovish leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a 
dovish reputation will tend to increase to a greater extent after female doves take 
escalatory foreign policy actions.  
H7: Compared to male dovish leaders, the public approval of female leaders with a 
dovish reputation will tend to decline to a greater extent after female doves take de- 




Note on the Selection Effect 
Leaders are strategic. This means that a national executive anticipates and avoids those 
foreign policy strategies that are likely to be penalized by the public. If indeed, leaders select 
themselves only into the situations that they think will benefit their chances of maintaining their 
position in office (or party/faction reelection/holding on to power – depending on the political 
regime), then any public disapproval of national leaders after international crises could 
potentially be interpreted as a finding that is likely to be amplified in an experimental setting.  
Data  
To assess how a leader’s gender ideology, and conflict behavior impact his or her 
domestic net approval, this study utilizes a new, cross-national dataset to test the above 
hypotheses, combining data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Maoz et. al., 
2017), the Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) dataset (Bell, 2016), the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Scartascini et. al, 2018), and the Executive Approval 
Database (EAD) 2.0 (Carlin et. al., 2019).  
The resultant time-series cross-sectional dataset uses the leader-year unit of analysis. The 
years of observation include 1975–2018 across 31 countries and 128 state leaders. Given the 
limited temporal scope and limited number of leaders, it is necessary to exercise caution in 
generalizing these findings.  
Dependent Variable 
My argument holds that publics will reward and penalize leaders differently based on 
their gender, ideology, and conflict behavior, so my dependent variable is executive public 
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approval ratings from the Executive Approval Database 2.0. The Executive Approval Database 
(EAD) 2.0 “represents the most comprehensive, publicly available collection of time-series 
indicators of public support for political executives in the world” (Carlin et. al., 2019, p. 1).  
Its advantage is that it measures presidential, prime ministerial, and government approval 
for states in which the national leader is either directly elected or indirectly elected by the 
legislature (Carlin et. al., 2019, p. 1). This continuous variable provides us with the most direct 
measure of changes in public opinion and gives us the most accurate sense of how domestic 
audiences are rewarding or penalizing their leader. The net executive approval by year shows us 
the percentage of positive responses minus the percentage of negative responses across 31 
countries in 1975–2018. 
Independent Variables 
Because our interest lies in determining whether citizens evaluate female and male 
national leaders’ foreign policy decisions differently, one independent variable is the national 
leader’s sex. This dichotomous variable Female coding females as 1 and males as 0 primarily 
came from The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance Dataset (REIGN). As this dataset 
had a temporal constraint up to 2016, I extended the coding of the sex of leaders in office in 
2016–2018. My sample includes 110 men and 18 women. Though there were more than 56 
female national leaders in the past century, only 18 female leaders are included in my analysis 
for several reasons. Some women were elected in mixed systems in which they were not the 
primary decision-makers in conflict. Another thirty women were excluded because they were the 
acting presidents and did not maintain their office for more than a few days or weeks. 
Additionally, missingness of public approval and conflict data also contributed to excluding 
female leader observations. 
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My second independent variable Ideology comes from the Database of Political 
Institutions. It is a trichotomous variable categorizing the chief executive as right-leaning, center, 
or left-leaning. This variable does not completely capture hawkish, moderate, and dovish foreign 
policy preferences but acts as a proxy. In this analysis, right-leaning is used to represent a 
hawkish leader while left-leaning is used as a proxy for dovish ones. In order to interpret how the 
interaction of gender and ideology affect executive approval, this variable was coded with right-
leaning as 1, center as 2, and left-leaning as 3. In addition, some male leaders (and none of the 
females) had no coded ideology, which has a value of 0.  
The third independent variable is Conflict Outcome; it records how a militarized 
interstate dispute ended. The data come from the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset from the 
Correlates of War project. Because “authority in the military emphasizes hierarchy so that 
individuals and units act according to the intentions of commanders,” the national executive is 
likely to have a significant amount of decision-making power in conflict even if there is civilian 
control of the armed forces or the executive is not the explicit commander in chief (Kohn, 1997, 
p. 141). These dispute outcomes therefore attempt to capture a leader’s hawkish and dovish 
preferences.  
The dispute outcomes show whether a leader yielded, compromised, or came to a 
stalemate in a conflict, with yield coded as 1, compromise as 2, and stalemate as 3.  I categorize 
a yield and compromise as dovish because these two outcomes imply that the leader was willing 
to either cooperate, negotiate, pursue other diplomatic avenues, or back down from a militarized 
aggression. I categorize a stalemate as hawkish because this implies that the leader was unwilling 
to back down militarily and may have been less inclined towards negotiation or compromise. 
The dispute outcome was coded as 0 when none of these outcomes occurred in a year and when 
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leaders experienced no conflicts in a year, attributing a more dovish behavior to that leader if 
they were able to diplomatically avoid all types of militarized interstate conflict. Losses and 
victories were not included because the loss or victory of a nation in conflict does not reflect the 
decisionmaker’s actions. Rather, these outcomes may have been due to forces like military size 
and strength, alliances, and other factors beyond the leader’s hawkish or dovish preference. 
Thus, a militarized interstate dispute outcome of a yield, compromise, or stalemate provides the 
best measure of a leader’s foreign policy preferences in dealing with adversaries. 
Controls 
This research controls for country-specific variation by employing fixed effects. In 
addition, I control for Duration in Office, a cumulative sum of years during which the leader has 
held office. 
In the future versions of this research, it will be important to control for economic 
indicators and international rivalries.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in my analysis. My sample 
includes the leaders of 31 countries, with 110 men and 18 women. The male leaders in my 
sample held their executive positions between 1975-2018 in all 31 countries while the women in 
my sample included those who held office between 1979-2018 across 14 different countries. As 
for leaders classified as hawks because of their right leaning ideology, 49 were men and 8 were 
female. On the left, 45 men and 8 women were classified as doves. The rest were in the center, 
making the two ideological groups of interest roughly equally represented in the sample. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 N          Mean            SD           Min           Max           Sum 
Net Approval 539 4.444308 22.56478 -79.7141 63.09252 2395.482 
Ideology 539 1.697588 1.151778 0 3 915 
Female 539 0.1762523 0.3813887 0 1 95 
Conflict outcome 539 0.7625232 1.275741 0 3 411 
Country ID 539 217.9759 226.01 2 920 117489 
Year 538 2000.92 9.14273 1975 2018 1076495 
Duration in office 539 7.12987 3.916154 0 19 3843 
Observations 539      
Method 
The dependent variable, domestic public net approval of the national leader, is 
continuous, thus I use ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors to estimate 
the effects of independent variables on public opinion. I test whether the gender of the national 
leader interacts with their ideology to influence domestic public approval (Model 1, Table 5). I 
also test whether gender interacts with conflict outcomes to impact public approval (Model 2, 
Table 5).  
Additionally, using the same method and model specification, Models 3 and 4 of Table 8 
present the split sample analysis for male and female leaders separately. These models serve as 
de factor three-way interaction effects between gender, ideology, and conflict outcomes.  





 The expectations describe an interaction between three theoretical determinants of public 
opinion: gender, ideology, and conflict outcome. In the following two sections, I first analyze the 
impact of interactions between gender and ideology and gender and conflict outcome using the 
full sample. I then present the analysis of the interaction between ideology and conflict outcome 
for the split samples of male and female leaders separately.  
Analysis Using Full Sample with Two-Way Interactions 
The results presented in Table 5 inform us whether female leaders are evaluated 
differently than men as a function of their ideologies (holding conflict outcomes constant) and as 
a function of conflict outcomes (holding ideology constant). It is important to note, however, that 
these results do not test the hypotheses directly.  
Model 1 of Table 5 shows how gender conditional on ideology shapes public opinion of 
leaders. All coefficient estimates in Model 1 with the exception of Conflict Outcome are 
statistically discernible at the 95–99% confidence level, meaning that under the repeated data-
generating process this effect would be observed by chance alone less than 5–1% of the time. 
The coefficient for Female in Model 1 shows the impact of gender when ideology is set to zero. 
Recall that ideology set to 0 is not meaningful for female leaders (as there are none in the sample 
who were coded that way). The estimate for Ideology in Model 1 captures the impact of one-unit 
increase in ideology for male leaders: as their ideology changes from no ideology to right-
leaning to center to left-leaning their net approval increases by 3 percentage points. It is 
important to note that this finding does not undermine the hawk's advantage thesis, as the hawk’s 
advantage is implied to exist only during the times of rapprochement, while this model includes 
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observations during both conflictual and peaceful times. The coefficient for the interaction term 
labeled Gender x Ideology shows that females who moved towards ideological left receive an 
almost 10 percentage point increase in public approval. To better interpret this interaction term, I 
rely on Table 6.  
Table 5: The impact of gender and ideology on net approval 
Independent    Models 
Variable   (1)  (2)   
Female   -30.26***        -7.72  
 (8.27)  (4.59)   
 
Ideology   3.19***   4.15***          
   (0.93)  (0.91)   
 
Gender x Ideology  9.82**      -----           
    (3.15)  -----  
 
Dispute Outcome     1.12    0.87          
  (0.78)  (0.82 )   
 
Gender x Outcome  -----            0.52    
    -----  (2.41)   
 
Duration in office   1.28*** 1.18** 
    (0.34)  (0.34) 
 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
 
Intercept   -17.12***   -17.63***    
    (4.05)  (4.14)   
N observations  539  539 
N countries   31  31 
N leaders   128  128 
N female leaders  18  18   
R2    0.373  0.358   
Note: Coefficient estimate (robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05. 
Table 6 shows the predicted values of net approval for all combinations of the interacted 
variables. The main takeaway from this analysis is that a leader’s gender indeed conditions the 
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relationship between their ideology and public approval, and that ideology has a substantively 
larger effect on women’s approval than on men’s. Hawkish females received substantially lower 
approval than their male counterparts (net approval for women falls within the 95% confidence 
interval of -27 to -5, while for men within that of -3 to 4.5), consistent with the ‘backlash effect’ 
where women are penalized for acting hawkishly, i.e., “outside” of their gender roles.  
It is important to note that this effect does not test my main argument directly, as these 
effects on approval are estimated independently of conflict outcomes. Furthermore, an average 
centrist male leader has substantially higher net approval than a typical female centrist:  4.8 to 
9.4 vs. -11.to 4.5. Only for leaders of left-leaning ideology there is no statistically discernible 
difference between males’ and females’ net approval. That is, only left-leaning women leaders 
avoid the gender penalty. 
Table 6: The predicted values of net approval by leaders' gender and ideology 
gender ideology 
predicted 
value se z p lower 95 upper 95 
men no ideology 0.7401537 1.909183 0.39 0.698 -3.010802 4.491109 
men right 3.927975 1.280655 3.07 0.002 1.411884 6.444067 
men center 7.115797 1.17049 6.08 0 4.816145 9.415449 
men left 10.30362 1.683713 6.12 0 6.995642 13.6116 
women no ideology -29.52395 7.737762 -3.82 0 -44.72627 -14.32164 
women right -16.51315 5.362438 -3.08 0.002 -27.04869 -5.977615 
women center -3.502353 4.049536 -0.86 0.388 -11.45844 4.453735 
women left 9.508446 4.775139 1.99 0.047 0.1267703 18.89012 
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 1 of Table 5. 
Model 2 of Table 5 shows how gender conditional on conflict outcome shapes public 
opinion of leaders. The constituent term coefficients for Dispute Outcome and for Female in 
Model 2 are not statistically discernible at conventional levels. Substantively, the coefficient 
Female is negative, implying that during the times of no conflict, female leaders are penalized in 
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net approval by almost 8 percentage point relative to men. This suggests that female leaders who 
pursued neither aggressive nor conciliatory approaches internationally still face a penalty for 
being female (regardless of ideology).  
Table 7: The predicted values of net approval by leaders' gender and conflict outcome 
gender outcome 
predicted 
value se z p lower 95 upper 95 
men no conflict 5.1054 1.314123 3.89 0 2.523554 7.687245 
men yield 5.976778 1.131946 5.28 0 3.752854 8.200702 
men compromise 6.848157 1.484226 4.61 0 3.932112 9.764203 
men stalemate 7.719536 2.119385 3.64 0 3.555598 11.88347 
women no conflict -2.617042 3.886985 -0.67 0.501 -10.25377 5.019685 
women yield -1.227634 4.407661 -0.28 0.781 -9.887328 7.432061 
women compromise 0.1617749 5.826903 0.03 0.978 -11.28629 11.60984 
women stalemate 1.551184 7.660589 0.2 0.84 -13.49951 16.60188 
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 2 of Table 5. 
Here, I discuss statistically nonsignificant results; while this may seem irrelevant, the low 
number of female observations makes it possible that differences do not appear statistically 
important due to a lack of cases. Therefore, assuming nonsystematic missingness of female 
observations, these substantive effects may suggest the effects from a fuller set of cases.  
The interaction term Gender x Outcome is neither substantively nor statistically 
important, as the predicted values of net approval for all combinations of values of gender and 
conflict outcome demonstrate (Table 7). That is, neither for male nor for female leaders’ public 
opinion changes noticeably if leaders pursue a yield instead of compromise or a compromise 
instead of stalemate. Although each predicted value of approval for male leader is different from 
0, they are not statistically different from each other. This means that the hawk’s advantage 
revealed by experimental studies may not exist in observational data. I discuss this possibility in 
the conclusion. 
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These values are also not statistically different from the approval of female leaders given 
the same conflict outcome. This is driven by the scarcity of observations for women in the 
specified conflict outcomes: out of 18 female leaders in the sample, none compromised and only 
1 female leader yielded and only 4 saw a stalemate, suggesting that female executives tend to 
avoid more conciliatory foreign policy outcomes. 
Analysis Using Split Sample: Men vs. Women 
 
In this section, I analyze the interaction between ideology and conflict outcomes for male 
and female leaders separately. This split sample approach effectively allows me to estimate the 
impact of a three-way interaction.  
Model 3 of Table 8 presents the interaction between Ideology and Conflict Outcome only 
for men, while Model 4 — only for women. In both models, the coefficient estimate for Ideology 
is positive and statistically significant. This means that one-unit change in Ideology generates a 
net positive approval for men (Model 3) and women (Model 4), who experience none of the 
conflict outcomes of interest: male leaders are estimated to see a 3 percentage point rise as their 
ideology changes from right-leaning to center to left-leaning, while for women each one-unit 
change in ideology generates a staggering 21 percentage point jump in approval when no conflict 
outcomes occur.  
While neither interaction term is statistically discernible, it is important to note that the 
signs for the interaction in Model 3 is positive but in Model 4 is negative. To ease interpretations 
of these effects, I have included all predicted values of net approval for male and female leaders 
in Tables 9 and 10 respectively. 
Table 9 conveys two main takeaways. First, left-leaning men enjoy higher net approval 
than right-leaning men regardless of conflict outcomes. For instance, when no conflict outcomes 
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occur, right-leaning and left-leaning male leaders are predicted to have a net 2 and 8 percentage 
point approval estimates respectively (Model 3). Within each category of ideology, as a male 
leader experiences no conflict outcome as opposed to yielding as opposed to compromise as 
opposed to stalemate, his net approval rises, however, these changes in predicted net approval 
are not statistically discernible from each other. That is, difference in predicted values of net 
approval for male leaders of different ideologies are statistically significant, but differences in 
predicted values of net approval for different conflict outcomes within the same ideological 
categories are not statistically discernible from each other.  
 
Table 8: The impact of gender and ideology on net approval for male vs. female leaders 
    Only men  Only women 
Independent     Models 
Variable    (3)   (4)  
 
Ideology                   3.26**              21.33***    
                           (1.14)                (2.939)            
  
Conflict Outcome          0.674                  8.777            
                           (1.31)                (5.269)            
  
Ideology x  Conflict Outcome 0.057                 -2.318            
                            (0.606)                (4.487)            
  
Duration in office           1.429***                 -0.674            
                            (0.365)                (0.866)            
 
Country fixed effects  Yes   Yes 
 
Intercept     -17.406***  -86.42*** 
     (4.259)  (10.48)  
N observations             444                     95            
N countries   31   14 
N leaders   110   18 
R2                      0.358                  0.561   
Note: Coefficient estimate (robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05. 
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value se z p lower 95 upper 95 
no ideology no conflict -1.423679 2.288816 -0.62 0.534 -5.922733 3.075376 
no ideology yield -0.7494341 1.81794 -0.41 0.68 -4.322902 2.824034 
no ideology compromise -0.0751896 2.189589 -0.03 0.973 -4.379197 4.228818 
no ideology stalemate 0.5990549 3.115584 0.19 0.848 -5.525152 6.723261 
right no conflict 1.835401 1.412689 1.3 0.195 -0.9414783 4.61228 
right yield 2.566524 1.098772 2.34 0.02 0.406702 4.726346 
right compromise 3.297647 1.450128 2.27 0.023 0.4471747 6.148119 
right stalemate 4.028769 2.163887 1.86 0.063 -0.224716 8.282255 
center no conflict 5.094481 1.161515 4.39 0 2.811326 7.377636 
center yield 5.882482 0.9340927 6.3 0 4.046365 7.718599 
center compromise 6.670483 1.345745 4.96 0 4.025193 9.315773 
center stalemate 7.458484 2.040741 3.65 0 3.447063 11.46991 
left no conflict 8.353561 1.816304 4.6 0 4.783308 11.92381 
left yield 9.19844 1.516771 6.06 0 6.21697 12.17991 
left compromise 10.04332 1.97959 5.07 0 6.152099 13.93454 
left stalemate 10.8882 2.855436 3.81 0 5.275357 16.50104 
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 3 of Table 8. 
 
Table 10 presents the predicted net approval for female leaders as a function of their 
ideology and conflict outcomes. I only show the net approval for the cases of no outcomes and 
cases of stalemates, as no women in the sample experienced a compromise and only one female 
leader yielded in a crisis, suggesting that female national leaders select themselves out of 
situations when they lose or compromise in international disputes. Furthermore, there are only 
four female leaders in the sample who collectively oversaw 13 stalemates, this makes the 
confidence intervals extremely wide for the estimates of net approval, which is why none of the 
estimates for the stalemate scenario are statistically discernible from each other. 
 Table 10 delivers two main takeaways. First, when female leaders experience no conflict 
outcomes, left-leaning females enjoy substantially higher net approval than right-leaning women. 
These estimates are statistically discernible from each other. Second, experiencing a stalemate 
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increases the net approval estimate of female executives, however these effects are not 
statistically important. 






value se z p lower 95 upper 95 
no ideology no conflict -42.54544 7.574844 -5.62 0 -57.62888 -27.462 
no ideology stalemate -16.21371 15.81522 -1.03 0.308 -47.70584 15.27842 
right no conflict -21.20746 4.308785 -4.92 0 -29.78734 -12.62757 
right stalemate -1.831304 4.976286 -0.37 0.714 -11.74035 8.077747 
center no conflict 0.130529 2.041439 0.06 0.949 -3.934494 4.195553 
center stalemate 12.55111 13.08589 0.96 0.34 -13.50622 38.60844 
left no conflict 21.46851 3.766138 5.7 0 13.96917 28.96785 
left stalemate 26.93352 26.25933 1.03 0.308 -25.35549 79.22252 
Note: Predicted values are based on Model 4 of Table 8. 
 
Robustness Checks 
I have checked whether the results are impacted by dropping any particular leader; they 
are not.  
I have also run the analysis with two versions of the Dispute Outcome variable, the first 
in which victories and losses were included in the 0 category and the second excluding victories 
and losses from the 0 category so that 0 represents a leader having no militarized conflicts in that 
year. Since victories and losses were not common, this only resulted in the list-wise deletion of 
seven observations and did not affect the results, as is demonstrated by Tables 11 and 12 which 
replicated Tables 5 and 8 respectively.  
 I also ran models with two-way fixed effects, such that not only country-level variation 
but also year-level variation was accounted for. All results are very similar.  
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Table 11: Robustness checks for Table 5 
 
Independent    Models 
Variable   (5)   (6)   
Female   -30.60***  -7.662*    
(8.260)  (4.622)           
  
Ideology   2.945***  3.942***  
(0.935)  (0.926)           
 
Gender x Ideology  10.01***                        
(3.154)                                 
  
Dispute Outcome  1.104    0.837           
 (no victories or losses) (0.789)  (0.828)           
 
Gender x Outcome  0.536           
(2.409)           
 
Duration in office  1.277***  1.181***  
(0.343)  (0.351)           
  
Country fixed effects  Yes   Yes   
 
Intercept   -16.55***  -17.10***    
(4.06)   (4.15) 
N observations  532   532           
N countries   31   31 
N leaders   128   128 
N female leaders  18   18 
R2                      0.372                  0.357   
Note: The baseline category of Conflict Outcome represent no conflict only. Coefficient estimate 




Table 12: Robustness checks for Table 8 
    Only men  Only women  
Independent     Models 
Variable   (7)    (8)  
 
 
Ideology   2.931 **  21.34 ***   
(1.150)  (3.494)           
  
Dispute Outcome   0.519   8.777*                      
(no victories or losses) (1.307)  (5.269)                    
  
Ideology X Dispute Outcome 0.137   -2.319                       
     (0.608)  (4.488)          
 
 
Duration in office  1.430***  -0.675           
(0.370)  (0.866)           
 
Country fixed effects  Yes   Yes   
 
N observations  437   95           
R2    0.356   0.561           
N countries   31   14 
N leaders   110   18   
Note: The baseline category of Conflict Outcome represent no conflict only. Coefficient estimate 
(robust standard errors); ‘***’p< 0.001 ‘**’ ’p< 0.01 ‘*’ ’p<0.05. 
 
Limitations and Future Work 
The current study is an early step towards unpacking the influence of gender, ideology, 
and conflict outcomes on public approval of national leaders. The data utilized in this study have 
many shortcomings. Mainly, in my future work, I will recode the ideology measure such that it 
captures a leader’s foreign policy positions as opposed to positions within the ideological 
landscape of domestic policy. For instance, a hypothetical president Hillary Clinton would have 
been coded in these data as left-leaning, therefore my model would assume her as a dove on 
foreign policy despite her enthusiasm for interventionism. Coding hawk vs. dove reputation 
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would also alleviate data missingness problem which forces me to remove some observations of 
female leaders in conflict.  
Additionally, observational studies are prone to some omitted variable biases. Here, there 
is the chance that significant shifts in executive approval data based on executive scandals or 
drastic changes in social or economic stability were not accounted for.  
In addition to recoding key variables and expanding the number of controls in the 




 Despite significant progress towards gender equality, the data reveal women leaders are 
evaluated differently than their male counterparts. My argument centers on a leader’s foreign 
policy actions interacting with their ideology and gender to affect public approval ratings. The 
data demonstrate that militarized conflict outcomes do not significantly shift public opinion, 
though ideology and gender do. Therefore, I did not find evidence to support my hypotheses 1 
through 4 and 6–7. My fifth hypothesis, that the public approval of female leaders with a 
hawkish reputation would not be expected to fluctuate in response to foreign policy actions when 
compared to male leaders, was inconclusive. It appears that foreign policy actions had little 
impact, but hawkish females did receive substantially lower approval ratings than male hawks, 
male doves, and female doves.  
Another expectation—that the public approval of female leaders would tend to stay the 
same (no approval bump) after taking foreign policy actions that deviated from their prior policy 
reputations while men would receive a boost in public approval—could not be tested, as none of 
the female leaders in this sample ever compromised and there was only one instance of yielding. 
This strongly suggests that women try to avoid conciliatory outcomes, in line with the gender 
norm deviation reward worldview.  
Furthermore, the data reveal that—in contrast to the experimental findings—men on the 
other hand, do not appear to experience an advantage for deviating from prior reputations. My 
hypothesis that all else equal, the public approval of male leaders would tend to increase after 
taking foreign policy actions that deviated from their prior policy reputations and decline after 
taking foreign policy actions that adhered to their prior reputations, was not consistent with the 
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data. While male hawks were estimated to receive higher net approval when they exhibited 
conciliatory outcomes, male doves enjoyed even more net approval when they did so.  
While future studies should attempt to test the hawk’s advantage hypothesis against a 
fuller set of cases, this thesis provides grounds for doubting whether the hawk’s advantage can 
be observed empirically for either men or women, as leaders strategically avoid disadvantageous 
conflict outcomes. There may be potential for more peace if both male hawks and male doves are 
rewarded for conciliatory foreign policy. Women on the other hand, may not receive the same 
public approval rewards.  
Where women appear to select themselves out of conciliatory, left-leaning, or dovish 
behaviors in times of militarized interstate conflict, this analysis has uncovered that women in 
this sample were significantly rewarded for a left-leaning or dovish ideology. While the hawk’s 
advantage thesis suggests that men with hawkish ideologies are advantaged over doves when 
pursuing rapprochement policies in experimental data, I find that women received higher public 
approval when leaning ideologically left, with left in this data presuming dove behavior on 
foreign policy. I also find that when holding conflict outcomes constant, female hawks received 
the worst net approval compared to male hawks and to women who leaned more towards dove 
ideology.  
The gendered double bind that women face suggests that women have to be feminine in 
office to maintain their support, but that the very display of femininity during times of conflict 
may be used against them to show that they are incompetent leaders and that their strategies are 
not in the interest of the nation. Therefore, women face significant barriers both in reaching high-
status political positions and in choosing foreign policy strategies. The perpetuation of gender 
biases and their impact on shaping a state’s foreign policy decisions in conflict has far-reaching 
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and costly implications. If women are only supported by voters when initiating or 
escalating a conflict, then this may incentivize more hostile international relations when women 
are elected during times of conflict. The results of this analysis offer some hope in that if left-
leaning or dovish women are likely to be supported for their ideology, even if they are not 
supported for acting on those preferences in times of militarized conflict, then there may be more 
room for reconciliation between adversarial nations led by women leaders. 
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